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Routing Form
Doc. No.:

Date:

Indicate title of person to take action and that of the originator. Place comments thereunder by numbered paragraphs. Initial in center of page and draw a line across the page and forward. Each recipient is to repeat above procedure until action completed and ready for filing. This cover-sheet must be retained with enclosure.

TO:

FROM

DATE

C/PP

[]

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

2003

DC/P

C/P

Ideas here OK - But think we should hold & I'll discuss in Wash. - Any help or ideas which [] has could usefully be put in the hopper - but agree that the US-BURNT aspects have to be done in Wash. The internal BURNT can be done largely here. in so far as possible. []

Exec

Disagree Para 3 as too poor a characterizing.

C/9

Suggest full time - or half-time officer on [], per Para 4.

In view US leadership in Caracas anti-Communist resolution, don't see why US can't recognize earliest

C/PP

DC/P

[] Ray Laff - (SS) advised they were in this in the Dept. []

C/P

Exec

Certain aspects should be in consideration
plan - [] 25/ []

C/PP []

P-7/Polcom

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13 May 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/P

SUBJECT: Diplomatic Recognition and Related Measures

REF: (A) HUL-A-446
(B) Memorandum for the Record, subject "Trip to Washington DC on May 4-5", dated May 7 (paragraph 7/a)

1. I submit that the entire question of diplomatic recognition and official U.S. relations to CALLIGERIS' regime after D-day should be reviewed in connection with the pressing deception problem. It seems therefore desirable that the initiative in recognizing said regime should not emanate from the U.S., but from countries like Nicaragua, Honduras, Cuba or the like. U.S. recognition might come soon thereafter.

2. In order to prepare the ground for such recognition, several steps appear possible:

- (a) U.S. might suggest to some of the countries concerned to take right now diplomatic steps against the present Guatemalan government, which might range from simple protests, recall all ambassadors for lengthy "consultations" etc., all the way to a complete break in diplomatic relations. There appears to be ample reason for such steps, especially the obvious interference of Guatemala in the internal affairs of other countries, like the fomenting of the Honduran strikes, unauthorized landing of a military aircraft, channelling of communist propaganda through Guatemalan diplomatic missions, close contacts between Guatemalan diplomats and local communists, and so forth.
- (b) In any case, we might suggest to CALLIGERIS to designate some men as "unofficial ambassadors" to some of the countries concerned, giving them sealed orders instructing them to establish contact with the respective governments or heads of state on D-day. For security reasons, these sealed orders might be held by our field stations until D-day, with the understanding that arrangements for quick transmittal will be made ahead of time.
- (c) Regardless of whether or not (b) is feasible, the STATE DEPARTMENT should prepare secret instructions for the U.S. missions concerned (not to be issued before D-day) to intervene on the top level in order to obtain fast recognition, without showing U.S. pressure or initiative, possibly presenting the need for such recognition as the logical consequence of the CARACAS resolution.

3. In order to further strengthen our efforts to divert responsibility for PERSUCCESS away from the U.S., recognition of the CALLIGERIS regime might not only come after recognition by some Latin American republics, but might also be accompanied by a cautious statement which could conceivably read approximately like this: "The U.S. regrets that this change of regime has not been brought about by constitutional, democratic means. However, the U.S. recognizes that the danger of Guatemala becoming a center of communist subversion for the entire hemisphere was growing fast, that freedom of speech and assembly had been severely curtailed and that it was becoming increasingly doubtful whether the communist-dominated Arbenz regime would ever submit to the test of truly free elections again. It is only for these reasons that the U.S. extends immediate recognition to the new regime, hoping that it can thereby contribute

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to the speedy normalization not only of the political situation in Guatemala, but also of the relations between Guatemala and other Latin American republics which have become increasingly strained as a result of communist interference with the internal affairs of other countries."

4. If more planning for the political and economic developments in Guatemala after D-Day is desired, as seems implied in reference B, I recommend that this responsibility be squarely placed upon the regular staff of WH Division at Headquarters: the staff of LINCOLN is too pre-occupied with carrying PBSUCCESS up to D-Day, it does not include enough area specialists and it is likely to be disbanded after D-Day anyhow. It would therefore be logical that WHD should begin to work on these matters immediately, with LINCOLN merely serving as a transmission belt between Headquarters on the one hand, CALLIGERIS, [] and possibly others on the other hand, during the period prior to D-Day.

[]
C/1

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